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The topic, What is a corporation ?-using the last word in
its fullest significance-is one which has exercised the inge-
nuity of philosophers and jurists for centuries. Varying
conceptions of the nature of a corporation-not to mention
those which have become obsolete-run at present from the
organic one of Gierke, who declares that a corporation is a
real, living being, to that of Duguit, who insists that it is
but the shadow of a name, having no real existence
(neant.). Between these two extremes lie almost every
conceivable view.
We save ourselves, however, from the embarrassment
of choice by thus defining a corporation as discussed in this
essay: A corporation is ar association of persons which
the law treats in many respects as if it were itself a person,'
having an existence whose duration is determined by the
positive law. This statement, we believe, embodies the dis-
tinctive features of a corporation as they have always existed
1 So far this is the definition of the Anonymous author in the Ency-
clopodia Brittanica.
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in the law. Other attributes may co-exist, for corporations
have been of many sorts, but we think they are all to be
known under any disguise by the features mentioned.
Although our discussion 'will be of the legal conception
of a corporation, we shall also consider the bearing upon it
of the views held by those who have examined the subject
in its philosophic aspects. While the reflections of the
cabinet may seem too far removed from the contentions of
the forum to be of practical importance, their influence upon
the living law is great. Since the courts have failed to
give us a doctrine of corporation law satisfactory in prac-
tice, it remains to be seen if just and sensible rules cannot be
somehow formulated. The history of the law upon this
topic shows only too clearly the disastrous effects upon the
law, as administered, of a perverted analogy. It is our
purpose to show that the common law, as far as it exists in
spite of an enormous mass of legislation upon the subject,
is returning, though with difficulty, to a healthy state.
From the earliest ages man, being a gregarious animal,
has found in association the greatest opportunity for self-
realization. From that far time when the patriarchal idea
took form, to the present moment of vast combinations of
individual resources, the idea of co-operation has-flourished
and developed. Since the period when men perceived that a
single man, however great his mental or physical strength,
can achieve but infinitely small results; and that the united
efforts of many men are much more potent than the indi-
vidual and disassociated efforts of the same number of men;
we have had a steady progression in variety and number of
forms of societies.
Since pre-historic times men have been actuated more or
less by the desire to acquire property. The natural wish to
appropriate as one's own whatever was useful or pleasing
is as old as man himself.
It is in the synthesis of these two ideas that existed the
fallow field for the germination of the concept of a corpora-
tion.
Obviously, since an inevitable result of association was
the acquisition of common property, the difficulty of dis-
posing of it in a just way upon the death of any or all of
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the associates was the earliest factor in the development of
the notion of an ownership in the society as distinct from
the individual share of each member in the communal
goods. Evidently if the natural heirs of a member were
to succeed to their ancestor's interest in the common
property there might result the admission into the associa-
tion-if formed for a special purpose-of hostile elements
which would in time disrupt it. On the other hand it seems
repugnant to one's natural sense of justice that a man's
heirs should upon his death lose every right which he might
have enjoyed during his lifetime.
These considerations were of course not felt in primitive
times when the notion of individual rights was unknown.
Then the tribe was all in all and the good of each was the
good of the clan.
But when the races left off their nomadic life and settled
down to enjoy the fruits of the earth different motives
supervened.
The primitive trace of the concept of a corporation ap-
pears in the case of religious associations. In those ancient
times land was the only property which of itself produced
revenue. Accordingly pious kings from earliest times do-
nated fertile fields to priesthoods of Isis and of Bel. It
was of course most important to the religious community
to retain its lands whatever might happen to the constituent
members. And so, we are informed,2 religious corporations
existed in Athens as early as the time of Solon. The col-
legium of the Vestal virgins at Rome is also another ancient
example.
As nothing exists which has not been evolved from some
preceding fact, the common-law conception of a corpora-
tion has a direct relationship to the collegia and universi-
tates of the Roman law. Indeed, in the language of a
learned and luminous but anonymous author,3 "In no de-
partment of our law have we borrowed so copiously and so
directly from the civil law."
It is important, for a thorough understanding of our
subject, to know what was the view of the Roman law
2 Kent, Comm. i 4 th ed., pp. 268 et seq.
3 Encyc. Brit., Tit. Corporations.
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as to corporations at a period not later than the ninth cen-
tury. According to our learned author corporations then
existed much as we know them to-day. Moreover, as he
says, they were divided into four classes as follows: "(I)
Public governing bodies, or municipalities, civitates; (2)
religious societies, such as the collegia of priests and Vestal
virgins; (3) official societies, e. g., the scribe, employed in
the administration of, the state; (4) trade societies, e. g.,
fabri, pictores, navicularii'-etc."
This it will be observed is in large measure the same
division as that prevailing to-day in systematic treatises
on the subject. In all thee various forms of association,
however, there were clearly to be perceived two distinctive
features: (I) The corporation as such had an existence
separate from that of the associates; (2) this existence
was perpetual and in no wise dependent upon that of the
associates. The reason for the separate entity was that
some one person, real or imaginary, must hold title to the
common property. The immense convenience of having
an undying titulary gave rise to its existence.
To revert to the division of corporations as made in the
civil law, it will be perceived that corporations then, as now,
could be divided into two great classes, to-wit: those for
profit and those not for profit. In English law the latter
appear first.4 We shall, therefore, be concerned with them
for some space hereafter, relegating the former to a place
later in the discussion. It must be borne in mind that while
there was a ready-made system of Roman jurisprudence in
relation to corporations which Ilartook of the nature of
gilds or trading companies, there was no space for its appli-
cation in England until about the fifteenth century.
Accordingly we shall briefly summarize the conditions
existing in England before the Norman invasion.
The early Christian Church had been flourishing for some
centuries and many religious -houses had acquired large
property.
The primitive Christian notion seems to have been that
the title to Church property was vested in the religious
'Ecclesiastical corporations first appear Kyd, p. 95.
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community. 5 Centuries later, in line with the centralizing
tendency of the papacy, the clergy assumed the ownership
of the property donated to religious and charitable uses.
From being mere fiscal administratorse of a common fund,
the episcopi became dispensers of it. According to the
accepted view the prelacy held such possessions as stewards
of God. They, being appointed by divine right, were the
final arbiters of its dispensation. The lay congregations
seem to have had, in the eighth century, no voice in dis-
posing of what would now be charitable trust funds.7 This
arrangement proved highly satisfactory until the introduc-
tion of feudalism. How far, under the Saxon domination,
the feudal system held sway is a moot question. But at all
events it was after its establishment that corporations sole
and aggregate appear.
We must believe, then, that the Roman law of corpora-
tions was brought from the Continent by the comparatively
sure and rapid means of the clergy. As, in those semi-
barbaric times, the Church was the only depository of learn-
ing, it is so probable as to be certain that knowledge of the
civil law was transplanted into England at an early period.
Unfortunately our materials for the history of the "dark
ages" are extremely scanty. Only monkish chronicles, for
the most part diaries of obscure monasteries, survive. It
is impossible to predicate, then, at what precise epoch the
Roman law of corporations first took lodgment in Eng-
land." But it was assuredly before the Conquest.9 Then,
as in earlier times, land was the only revenue-creating prop-
erty. This fact must be borne fully in mind in endeavoring
to trace the history of the law under this title. . The raison
d'etre of corporations is thus well stated by Blackstone.1"
"So, also, with regard to holding estates or other property,
if land be granted for the purposes of religion or learning to
twenty individuals not incorporated, there is no legal way
of continuing the property to any other persons for the
5 Organization of the Early Christian Church. E. Hatch. Bampton
Lectures, 1800, p. 152. 6 b. Ch. VIII, per tout. 7 lb.
1 In the Constitutions of Clarendon, cap. ii, mention is made of grants
of churches "in perpetuum." This was in 1164. St., Sel. Ch., p. 138.
' See Kyd, Corporations, pp. 42-43, quoting Millar.
10 Bk. I, Ch. 18, p. 468.
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same purposes but by endless conveyances from one to the
other, as often as the hands are changed."" It will be re-
membered that although this was a time when title passed by
livery of seisin, the argument is none the less forcible. An-
other powerful reason is thus stated by the learned com-
mentator.12 "If this were a mere voluntary assembly, the
individuals which composed it might indeed read, pray
together, so long as they could agree to do so; but
they could neither frame nor receeive any laws or rules of
their conduct; none, at least, which would have any bind-
ing force, for want of a coercive power to create a sufficient
obligation."
It is impossible at this point not to mention the condition
of the Church at this epoch. The idea of papal supremacy
in temporal as well as in spiritual affairs had been born. At
that period all men above the condition of serfs were war-
riors or priests. The great middle class, which was so pro-
foundly to influence European history, had not yet appeared
upon the stage. Accordingly it is not to be denied that there
were within the pale of the Church men greatly ambitious
for themselves and not in the slightest degree concerned
with the salvation of souls. Once the notion of world-
dominion in papal hands took form it was but a natural
means toward the realization of this dream that every
effort should be made toward enriching the Church and,'
consequently, making it more powerful. As the Church at
that time had all the learning and almost all the intellect
of Christendom, it was inevitable that the ready-made
means of holding and transmitting property in perpetuity
as accomplished under the Roman law should be used as a
powerful means of forwarding the interests of the clergy.1
3
However desirable for the hierarchy the establishment of
ecclesiastical corporations was before the advent of William
and his mailed retainers, it became imperative afterwards. 14
n A striking example of this, at a later period, is to be found in the
case of Lenche's Trust. See English Gilds, pp. 256 and 266.
12 lb., pp. 467-468.
13 History of the Christian Church, Vol. II, Middle Ages, Dr. Wilhelm
Moeller, p. 307.
" The earliest mention we have been able to find, of the word "uni-
versitas" occurs in the charter of the city of Oxford (1255). Stubbs,
Sel. Ch., 377.
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Feudalism in its most rigorous form soon became estab-
lished and flourished for several centuries. It is not our
purpose here to enter at length into a discussion of the
system. We shall simply indicate how it stimulated the
growth of the idea of religious corporations. Briefly the
scheme was this: In a time when life and property were
at the mercy of him who chose to take and when the castles
of robber barons dotted every hill, it was needful that he
who valued his possessions should be prepared to maintain
them by the strong hand. Accordingly at this period mili-
tary organization became a necessity. Of trade and com-
merce, "business," as we know it now, there was practi-
cally none. There were the tillers of the soil, rude unlet-
tered creatures, half savage and wholly barbarous. Over
and above them at an immeasurable distance in the social
scale were the war lords. These men, in many respects no
whit better than their serfs, were nevertheless trained to the
highest pitch, according to the notions of their age, in the
art of war. Military organization as then understood was
the pillar of the state.
It has been said inelegantly but most truly by the greatest
general the world has ever seen that "an army moves on its
belly." Some one then must supply the sinews of war.
These purveyors were the villeins, the farmhands of that
time. In return for protection to life and land they ren-
dered to their superiors a portion of the produce of the
soil. Nay more, they were bound to render military service
to their lords in time of war, or, what was often the same
thing, at his whim. This was known as villeinage.15 The
same idea was carried out in the higher strata, of society.
The smaller barons in return for the protection of a still
greater lord were bound to render services under certain
conditions and held their lands by knight's service. And
so, up to the lord paramount who, in England after the
Conquest,1 6 was the king. The fundamental idea being
that a man possessed all he had by might alone. As women
and boys were non-combatants, it was of course due to the
exigencies of unsettled times that when the tenant died
leaving an heir incapable of bearing arms the feudal su-
Is B1. Bk. II, p. 48. 1, Brac. L. 4, tr. i, c. 28.
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perior should step in during the continuance of such period
and assume control of the henchmen of the defunct vas-
sal.17 In the earlier decades of the feudal rigime this right
seems not to have been abused. But later the lords para-
mount acted in most oppressive fashion, often ruining the
inheritance during their incumbency. Another "of the
greatest grievances of tenure""' was that of reliefs. These
were compositions made by the heir with the lord for the
latter's permission to succeed to the estate. "At the first
they were merely arbitrary and at the will of the lord, so
that if he pleased to demand an extortionate relief, it was
in effect to disinherit the heir."' 9 Still another vexatious
incident of tenure was that of fines which must be paid by
the tenant to the lord whenever the former aliened his
land. The reason given for their exaction-the motive
being the rapacity of the barons-was that since the new
tenant might be persona non grata to the lord, some com-
pensation must be made for his wounded feelings. This
last requirement, however, seems to have been principally
if not entirely applied to the tenants in capite, which class
included the ecclesiastics of highest rank.20
The only remaining incident of feudal tenure important
to our discussion was that of escheat. This happened when
the tenant's heirs became extinct or, what was legally to.the
same effect, when they suffered corruption of the blood
so as to lose the capacity to inherit. The land then reverted
to the lord.
2
1
It will thus be easily perceived how great advantages,
or rather avoidance of disadvantages, would accrue to
associations if some kind of immortal legal persons could
be created for the purpose of holding their lands. Stress
of circumstances drove the hierarchy to the adoption of the
familiar conception of the Roman law.22
The embryo thus formed grew with amazing rapidity,
17 B1. Bk. II, p. 66. Is B1. Bk. II, p. 65. I, lb.
20 Stubbs, Sel. Ch., pp. 324-5 and 1 5 . 21 B1. Bk. II, p. 73.
22 The study of the Roman Law was revived in the reign of Stephen
(1135-ir54) and continued under Henry II. Stubbs, Sel. Ch., pp. 124
and 136. John granted his kingdom to the pope (Innocent), and "his
successors," in terms used to-day in grants to corporations. lb., pp.
284 and 285.
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displaying traits not seen in its Latin ancestry. The quasi-
military organization of the Church demanded that the
superiors of the orders should have control of the disposi-
tion of religious property. No doubt this was found a
most salutary restraint on the tendency of independent and
fractious communities to escape from under the papal
thumb. So it became the law that certain religious asso-
ciations could act only with the sanction of their heads.
23
This principle resulted in what was probably an unfore-
seen and undesired result; that when the superior died,
the corporation being unable to act until his successor was
chosen, was unable to inherit from the deceased head.
2 4
Moreover, there arose in the law of England the corpora-
tion sole,25 which, as Blackstone says, "is a refinement of
our own." The corporation sole seems to have been an
ingenious adaptation of theory on the part of the princes
of the Church. They held their lands (after the Conquest)
in feudal tenure of the king. On the death of the incum-
bent the estate reverted to the crown. The successor to
the title must pay heavily for confirmation of his rights.
Of course by ownership in corporations aggregate this
burden could be avoided. But Church polity demanded that
bishops and abbots should have entire control of their
churches and abbeys. The thus conflicting interests of the
Church were ingeniously harmonized in the following way:
The notion of a titulary of the property of associated men
existing perpetually without reference to the death of any
of the associates was thought to permit of the further con-
ception that such titulary might exist without reference to
the death of all of the associates.2 6 So, the transition was
easy to the thought that an office might exist forever with-
out incumbents. A grant to a bishop by his corporate title
would thus avoid all feudal burdens as he (or it) would
never die. In this manner was Church government pre-
served intact and the overlord deprived of his revenue.
22 B1. Bk. I, p. 478. 24 lb. 25 See Kyd, Corporations, pp. 19-20.
26 "A dissolution of the corporation was not effected by the death
of all its members." Savigny. System, ii, 280, quoted by Taylor:
Private Corporations. However this may be, metaphysically speak-
ing, it was not the law as to corporations aggregate. Kyd, pp. 447-448.
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It is curious to observe that this hocus-pocus operation
has given rise to the maxim "the king never dies."2 As
happened so often the courts, reasoning by strained analo-
gies, decided that for purposes of various sorts the king
was a corporation sole.28 So it was said "the king can do
no wrong," meaning that the royal corporation sole can
perform no unregal act. If this means that he (or it): can-
not act ultra vires, and if, besides, the corporation sole is
created by the sovereign, we find that the lawyers were
sadly tangled in the webs of their own spinning. But even
to-day we hear about "Crown lands" and "His Majesty's
province."
Another aspect of the corporation sole is of practical
importance. It has been sought to give it some life in cases
of devises, etc., "to the treasurer, etc., of the A. corpora-
tion." By deciding that the treasurer, etc., is a corporation
sole it would be possible to support meritorious trusts which
would otherwise fail. This case, however, must be consid-
ered as anomalous, since the creation of a corporation
within a corporation is something that the most fine-spun
logic of medieval lawyers would hardly accomplish.29 The
subject is merely mentioned here to be finally dismissed, as
corporations sole have no more to do with our general sub-
ject than has the mistletoe with the growth of the oak.
Once having established this immortal entity, whether
"sole" or "aggregate," the scheme was found to work
extremely well, for the Church. As the religious houses
grew and flourished they necessarily absorbed in the course
tif a few centuries a vast amount of land. This state of
affairs bore hardly on the lords, who, by reason of the
inherent nature of the titular holder of the land, were, as
they felt, defrauded of many of their perquisites.30 Some,
however, remained. "Even the monasteries, till the time
of their dissolution, contributed to the knighting of their
founder's male heir, . . - and the marriage of his
female descendants." 31 Though the aids, as these obliga-
tions were called, survived, yet the diminution of the reve-
'7 Kyd, p. xo5, quoting Co. Lit. 28 Kyd, p. 28.
'* It was tried, however. See Gierke, Political Theories of the Mid-
dleAges,p. 27. Cf .Kyd,p. 33, andesp. p. 35.
10 Kyd, p. 70. 31 BI. Bk. II, p. 64.N.
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nue to the nobles was so serious as to lead at an early day 2
to the passage of the so-called statutes of mortmain, aimed
at restraining or preventing the increase of property
in dead hands P3 No doubt this measure was one of self-
preservation, since, barring revolutions, the Church in the
course of many centuries would acquire all the land in .Eng-
land. Indeed, in France, in the middle of the eighteenth
century, it had acquired one-third of all the land in the king-
dom.
While the capacity of religious corporations to absorb
realty was thus impaired, their ability to aliene property
was, in the reign of Elizabeth, 34 curtailed. The reason for
this inhibition was to more nearly secure the fulfilment of
the intention of the pious founders by compelling the reten-
tion by the donee of the very lands, on the once ascertained
value of which the charity had been erected. As ecclesias-
tics were in the habit of making leases for long terms of
years without impeachment for waste, receiving therefor
large sums of money which they immediately used; the
consequence was that their successors took only a -bare
estate.3 5
The condition of corporations as a title of English law
appears in the end of the fourteenth century to have been
this: .Starting with a ready-made concept of the Roman
law that an association might hold property for itself as
distinct from thd associates,36 and driven under stress of
feudal burdens, the lawyers of the time, who were practi-
cally all churchmen, had firmly established the notion of a
titulary of property different from anything hitherto known
to English law. This creation, by analogy, was endowed
3 1225, Kyd, p. 88.
31 In 1294, according to the chronicle of W. de Hemingb. ii, 53 (cited
in Stubbs, Select Chaiters, p. 438). The bishops "besought [the king]
especially that the statute of mortmain which had been enacted
to the prejudice of holy mother church, should be nullified." These
statutes applied only to gifts inter vivos. Lands were not devisable to
corporations even after the passage of the Wills act, 32 Hen. VIII, Ch.
x and 34, & 35 Hen. VIII, Ch. 5.
34 x Eliz. C. i9, forbids alienation by bishops. Later greatly ex-
tended. 31 Kyd, pp. io8 et seq.
16 See Sohm, Institutes of Roman Law, pp. 104-1o6.
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with many human attributes. For purposes of convenience
we shall hereafter speak of it as the humanesque conception.
The practical advantages ensuing upon the establishment
of such a fertile and useful idea caused its extension from
the field of ecclesiastical holdings to that of the common
interest. Accordingly we find that in the reign of Henry IV
(1399-1413) municipal corporations first appear.3 7 Chiv-
airy and feudalism were losing their power, and before the
rising tide of the people were ere long to go down in ruin.
With the increase of population and the tendency toward
concentration in towns a new power arose. When col-
lections of individuals were to be found in many places out-
side of Norman keeps it was realized that the government
of such bodies of meft could be best accomplished if the
cities themselves became responsible as entities. Of course
the economic reason was strong also. As there were com-
mon rights somebody must be found who could assert them.
At all events it is at this time that we first learn of the
application of the corporate idea to lay communities in
England.
38
Since the time of Justinian there had existed, especially
in Italy, a body of industrious persons known as Scoliasts,8 9
who were perennially busy in their studies perfecting and
amplifying the corpus juris. From a mere mention of
"4corporation" in the code they had elaborated an entire
body of law upon the subject. Chief among these at the
beginning of the fifteenth century was the greatly learned
but otherwise contemptible Sinibald Fieschi, afterwards
Innocent IV. He it was, says Mr. Maitjland, 40 "who found
the phrase, the thought for which others had sought in
vain: The corporation is a person; but it is a person by
fiction and only by fiction." He was the creator of the
"Persona Ficta"--that invisible person acting in a
" Kent, Comm. and cf. Stubbs, Sel. Ch., pp. 252, 265, 313.
' But see- Kyd, p. 63. We deem the associations there mentioned
as outside of our definition and share his doubt as to the soundness of
Coke's dictum.
,9 Maitland, Introduction to trans. of Dr. Gierke's "Political Theo-
ries of the Middle Ages," p. xix.
0 Maitland, Introduction to Dr. Gierke's "Political Theories of the
Middle Ages," p. xxx.
COMMON-LAW CONCEPTION OF A CORPORATION. 541
medium of legal thought alone. This result, which so
easily symbolizes the more or less coherent mass of law
which had been growing up for centuries, may fairly be said
to be the fine flower of medimval jurisprudence. Certainly
it has survived to the present time. At this pioint it is neces-
sary to consider how these corporations were created. It
may seem that logically at all events this consideration
shoulQ have come first, but such was not the historical
development. We are told that at the civil law corpora-
tions existed simply because three or more persons united
themselves for a common purpose'. 41 Later, however, when
the Roman law was codified it became necessary to deter-
mine by what right such societies acquired the power to act
as one person, the fact being one which required some
explanation. Accordingly the compilers decided that the
right to create this anomalous thing-this immortal titulary
-was one of the sixty-seven prerogatives of the Princeps.
That point being established, his mere fiat was sufficient,
and, as it was desirable that some durable evidence of his
gracious act should survive, what more natural than that
he should grant a charter, which in its original signification
meant little more than a writing. Further, once the entity
was created it was necessary that its field of action should
be defined. This as a matter of convenience was also done
in the charter,42 a fact which has since led to some little
confusion of thought.4 3 As the age was one in which kings
and lords held monopolies of everything, there was needed
a specific grant of power to act. Hence the modern doc-
trine44 which has been evolved from the time when the
corporation could do only what it was granted the power to
do. It is important to bear in mind that the reason given
for the creation of a corporation-a thing then admitted
to have no tangible reality-was simply that it pleased the
prince; a reason which went very well with ideas of divine
right but which has not withstood the shocks of time.
As the prince might of his own will create, so, one would
think, he might arbitrarily destroy, a corporation. Clearly
1t BI. Bk. I, p. 472. " Kyd, p. 335-
11 E. g., thelearned Chancellor Kent, who defines a corporation as a
franchise! See Kyd, Corporations, p. 15 . NIntra, p. 546.
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there is no hardship, as some minds tinctured with the
humanesque idea4 5 might dream, in putting to death an
invisible creature. But-strange result-in England this
was not so. Though the king could create a corporation he
could not terminate its existence. 46  That execution could
be done only by Parliament. The logical reason would
seem to be that while the king was sovereign in name and
so, as a matter of convenience, could grant charters, in fact
Parliament was latterly so powerful that it could restrain
the king thus far. It amounted to, in fact, a tacit recogni-
tion of the principle that no one should be arbitrarily de-
prived of his property. It seems to have been well estab-
lished that upon the legal death of a corporation its realty
reverted to the heirs of the donor or in their absence
escheated, as did the personal property, to the crown.
47
Mediwval lawyers, who were more concerned with the
logical perfection of theories than with any sense of justice
in the concrete, allowed the associates under such circmun-
stances nothing at all.' 8 Obviously if the king could destroy
corporations at will and secure their property by escheat he
would have a power capable of great abuse.
We have now arrived, after some digressions, at the
state of affairs in England in the fifteenth century.
Within the cities which had already been deemed worthy:
of incorporation there were coming into existence associa-
tions of arts and crafts,' 9 known as gilds. These societies,
which first appear about the twelfth century,50 during the
Kyd speaks of a corporation committing suicide, Vol. II, p. 466.
"See Chitty's N. to B1. I, p. 485 and p. 67, Vol. I of Kyd and Vol. II,
P- 447. ' Kyd, Vol. II, p. 446.
4S Professor Gray in his splendid monogiaph on "Perpetuities" has
doubted if this reverter was ever the law save where religious corpora-
tions held the land in frankalmoign. Indeed the point seems well
taken, since if a monastery should be dissolved and the purpose of the
donor defeated who is in a better position to demand the return of the
land than his representative? The case is obviously different where,
as in moden trading corporations, an associate contributes his own
money to the common fund.
" These are to be clearly distinguished from the religious gilds which
had existed for centuries. See English Gilds, Introd., p. xiv.
" See Brentano's learned article "Craft Gilds" in "English Gilds,"
pp. cxiv ef seq.
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next two or three centuries were to affect profoundly the
social and economic condition of the kingdom.5" It is in
them that we perceive the first glimmering of anything
resembling our modern industrial corporations. They, too,
were thought worthy of incorporation sooi after the cities
had arrived at that dignity,52 being driven thereto by the
same considerations which from the earliest ages have
moved men to become associated and to hold property in
common.
IT the development of the law of corporations the six-
teenth century was a time mainly of stagnation. The
status of the religious associations was pretty well settled
and municipal corporations and, those of handicrafts were
being developed along similar lines, mutatis mutandis.
Nothing remarkable had happened in legal thought since
the advent of the persona ,icta.
Let us turn our attention for a moment to general condi-
tions prevailing in England during the reign of Elizabeth.
It seems upon observation to be the starting point of British
greatness. Spain was then the greatest empire and the
strongest power of Europe. England under the tutelage
of Cecil, ably abetted by Elizabeth, was gathering strength
for the inevitable conflict. Hardy mariners sailed the seas
- in the search for new lands. Finally came the crushing
defeat of the Armada, achieved in part by the force of
tempests and Spanish mismanagement as well as by the
valor of the English themselves. The net result was to
leave England mistress of the seas-a position which, with
some variation of fortune, she has maintained to the present
day. Obviously under such circumstances commerce was
greatly stimulated and trade began to flourish. It is about
the middle of the seventeenth century then that corporations
as we know them began to assume imporiance. As many
schemes made feasible by new conditions required large
amounts of capital, it was most natural that men should
unite their resources for the exploitation of such plans.
It is hard to say whether the notion of limited liability was
"1 English Gilds, pp. cli and cdxii.
52 In the ordinance of the Tailors of. Exeter (1466) the Gild appears
as having been previously incorporated. English Gilds, p. 301.
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absolutely established at that early period or not. We
have Blackstone's authority for it, and it seems to have been
the view generally received that the creditors of the cor-
poration should look to the corporate assets alone for satis-
faction of their claims. Certainly it seems in line with the
previous notions of corporations. Once we. admit, as was
unquestionably then the law, that there was a separate indi-
viduality, it must follow inevitably, as a matter of legal
logic, that debts contracted by the corporation were the
debts of the corporation and of no one else. We conceive,
then, that there existed at that period no liability of the
shareholders other than what might attach to their original
contribution. That being so, it is evident that corporations
must have been favored instruments for the carrying out of
speculative schemes where the promoters were unwilling to
risk more than a certain amount of capital.
In short, there is every reason to believe that as the
advantages of incorporation became generally recognized
they were more and more employed, until at the beginning
of the nineteenth century we find corporations multiplying
with startling rapidity.
In the early part of the sixteenth century the Persona
Ficta was firmly embedded in the law of England. In the
language of Coke, made familiar by the paraphrase of
Marshall, 53 "a corporation aggregate is invisible, and exist-
ing only in intendment of law." 54 This dogma led to some
curious results.
The strictly legal conception of a corporation, unaffected
by legislation, seems to have been as follows ever since the
time of Coke. A corporation aggregate is a body of men
which, by virtue of an act of the sovereign power, is consti-
tuted one legal person, whose existence is for a period, the
duration of which is pre-determined or determinable by the
sovereign.55  These are the essentials. But in matters of
detail there has been much fluctuation of opinion. The
earlier decisions, pursuing a convenient analogy, which
made the corporation a sort of spirit, and losing sight of the
fact that a corporation was originally devised merely for
51 Dartmouth Col. Case, 4 Wheat. Vr8, 636 (i8r9).
61 io Rep. 32. "1 Cf. Kyd, Corporations, p. x3.
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the purpose of holding property to the use of a certain class
of persons whose relations were not consanguineous, tried
to establish the proposition that whenever this intangible
creature could conceivably act like a real person, it was for
legal purposes such, and that where it could not conceivably
act as a; real person, e. g., in the performance of a physical
act, it was legally incapable of doing such an act.56  We
find it gayly stated in the early cases that a corporation
cannot commit a battery because, forsooth, it has no limbs.
Nor can it be guilty of slander, because it has no tongue.
It was found, however, that as the agents of corporations
while acting for them frequently were overzealous, and
committed acts which came within the rule as to respondeat
superior, some check upon this tendency was needed. Ac-
cordingly modern decisions are on a more equitable, if less
logical, basis.
57
But, although limitations were thus set, the corporation
was for some purposes a "real" person.5 s So it was endowed
with a will. This will was legally manifested by a series
of categorical statements affirmed by a majority, numeri-
cally or in interest,59 of the constituent members. Difficul-
ties flowed from this view. If, as by hypothesis, the cor-
poration is a real person having an existence of its own
and its will is that of the majotity of the stockholders, it
can, like any other person, give away its property by means
of contracts to the highest bidder, thereby rendering worth-
less the interests of the minority. This was a point, how-
ever, at which pure theory balked. On the other hand,
in order that business could be transacted, there must be
some method of deciding how it should be done without
the assent of an obstinate minority. After some oscillation
of opinion, the courts decided that such transactions could
be impeached for lack of good faith only. This, of course,
reduces the corporation, as far as its internal affairs are
concerned, to a partnership. The separate entity is thus
for some purposes declared non-existent.
56 Cf. Kyd, pp. 223, 224, 225.
6' See for an exhaustive philosophical discussion of this view Duguit,
L'Etat, Vol. II, pp. 25 et seq., esp. pp. 33-34.
's E. g., It was an "inhabitant" for purposes of taxation, Kyd, p. 317.
5, Kyd, p. 308.
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Further difficulties arose in determining at what point
the corporation ceased to be a person. For example, the
jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts, with their control
of matters of probate, was dependent, anciently in fact and
latterly in theory, on their ability to excommunicate those
disobeying its orders. But corporations, having no souls,
were not likely to be harmed by purely spiritual means.
Therefore a corporation could not act as executor because
not amenable to the Courts Christian.6" Such a decision is
in line with that condemning a locomotive as a deodand.
Another matter gave considerable trouble in the eigh-
teenth century. This was, how far corporations could
act by agents. The ancient English notion was that they
could act only through powers under their corporate seal. 61
Gradually, under stress of convenience amounting to neces-
sity, this rule was infringed upon 6 2 so that now it may be
broadly stated that a corporation, where its acts are directed
by its officers, can do whatever a natural person can.
It will be seen that if the doctrine that a corporation is
an invisible person be once accepted, the results reached in
the old cases are more logical. Unless, then, the modem
view can in some way be reconciled with the conception of
the Persona Ficta, it is evident that we must regard that
view as having been repudiated, in part at least. We have
suggested above that the reason why a corporation is
responsible for the torts of its agents is that it is the policy
of the law that one who stands in the position of a prin-
cipal should take the responsibility for whatever means are
employed to further the interests of the principal. But this
does not explain the fundamental difficulty. The question
is, how is the agency itself established? If the corporation
be in fact a separate person which is invisible and whose
acts are manifested to the external world only by documents
under the corporate seal, how can it ever be said to act
otherwise? -If the acts in question are authorized by an
60 1. e., it could not take an oath. This is, of course, no longer law
I Wins. Exrs., p. 27o, Kyd, p. 71, cf. lb. 277. 41 Kyd, p. 26o.
'Kyd quaintly remarks: "It has long been considered as an estab-
lished point, that to offices of ordinary service, such as that of cook
and butler, a corporation may appoint without a deed," p. 26o. This
was in 1793.
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officer of the corporation, how did this dumb creature give
him instructions.6 3 It may be said that he received
authority from the stockholders to act in the premises; but
how can the action of a number of individuals ever be the
act of one person? In other words, has the corporation a
will of its own? It is evident that at this point we touch
the whole notion of the Persona Ficta to the quick.
The next important step in the development of the law
under this heading was the rise and development of the
so-called "trust-fund" idea. An example will make this
plain. The A. Company is a corporation. The stock-
holders knowing that the concern has only enough money
to pay its creditors, divide up the assets among themselves
and leave the creditors to do without their money.64 In an
early case65 it was held that this could not be done. The
grounds of the decision of the chancellor (Finch) are
uncertain. Perhaps they are the broad ones of fraud, or
even the more vague ones of fair dealing. It is evident
that the former is not very satisfactory. The latter mani-
festly approaches the case of a partnership. The enuncia-
tion of a tangible principle governing this point hung in
the air for over a hundred years, until the decision'of the
famous case of Wood v. Dummer6 by Judge Story. He
it was who first enunciated the-thought that the corporate
assets were a "trust fund" for the benefit of creditors.
This idea, like the conception of the Persona Ficta, was of
that plausible variety which works extremely well in cer-
tain cases without being at all applicable to every case. It
is quite possible that Judge Story did not intend to convey
the meaning that such a fund was a technical, trust with
all the incidents attached to it by law. It seems, however,
that such was the common understanding. If the corporate
assets are a trust fund, we are at once confronted with the
difficulty of an uncertain res. Evidently the property of the
corporation cannot remain in specie; otherwise corporations
would soon cease to exist. If we then say that the trust
does not attach at all times, but only for the benefit of cred-
' Cf. Maitland, lc cit. xxxix, xl.
"The question of additional liability being out of the case.
' Naylor v. Brown, Finch, p. 83 (1673). " 3 Mason, p. 308 (1824).
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itors, when does it begin to run? Is the time to be calcu-
lated from actual bankruptcy or from the time when such
bankruptcy is discovered? Is the mere diminution of assets
below the value of the capital stock bankruptcy in this
sense or not? The idea, then, appears not quite such an
easy solution to the problems presented after all.
The rock upon which the Persona Ficta may be said to
have been shipwrecked was the question of de facto corpora-
tions. It is a very simple matter to say that an association,
which purports to be a corporation without ever having been
legally incorporated, has no corporate existence. But sup-
pose such association has received and consumed goods for
which it has contracted in the putative corporate name to
pay. Manifestly the vendor should be reimbursed. But
how can this result be legally achieved? The plaintiff has
contracted with what he believed to be a legal person, which,
however, has no existence even in legal thought. .-In such
a case we have a multitude of conflicting opinions.67 One
sword used to cut the Gordian knot is, that the defendant
is estopped to deny its corporate existence. But estoppel
is a principle of the law of torts. The action is one of
contract. If we consider, then, the doctrine of estoppel to
be inapplicable, the vendor is in a sorry plight. He has
contracted with-nobody. Therefore there is no contract.
A solution has been attempted on the basis of the so-called
"quasi-contract.1 68  This is, perhaps, less unsatisfactory
than any other.
The fact remains that if we adhere to the notion that a
corporation is a creature of the sovereign merely, we run
the risk of committing a grave injustice.69
We have seen that at Roman law corporations origi-
nally needed no fiat to bring them into being. Blackstone
reports that the only reason why they were brought under
control by Numa was that they had become a menace to the
peace of the city of Rome. It is true that these societies
were analogous to the medizeval gilds. The thought will
not be quelled that all this jargon of invisible beings, kingly
67 Full citations on these points will be found in Thompson, Comm.
on Law of Corps., Vol. I, Ch. XI. "Cf. Kyd, pp. 313-314.
" See Maitland, loc cit. p. xxxviii.
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prerogative, and all the rest of the paraphernalia of anti-
quated legal lore, is merely the effort of a bygone manner
of thinking to account for or to bring about certain desired
results. To-day, when men think more clearly and better
than ever on scientific subjects, there is perceived a ten-
dency to look through the veil of medieval mysticism, 70 to
see the corporation as it really is-a partnership, with limi-
tations, in respect to its internal affairs; a person, for cer'-
tain purposes only, as to the external world. This we
understand to be the view of Morawetz, whose book is the
first attempt to put the law upon a scientific basis.71
Finally it is to a Frenchman that is due the fame of
putting the last sod upon the grave of the Persona Ficta.
M. Duguit has considered the subject of the state with
exhaustive care.7- He finds this to be the real condition of
affairs: That states as entities have no existence, that the
conception of a sovereign-man or abstraction-is a myth.
That the only thing actually approaching these ideas are
small bodies of men who, for various reasons, impose their
wills upon the vast majority. Since this is so, ideas of
divine right and of popular government go by the board.
It follows that the Persona Ficta receives its death blow.
Because if the existence of the invisible being is dependent
upon the will of the prince (or-that which takes his place
in other forms of government, e. g., Parliament) and the
actions of the prince have no juristic value, the fictitious
person can have no juristic existence. Behind the concept
of a separate individuality as representing any form of
association from a partnership to a nation, there is nothing.
All the laws of modern legislatures as to corporations
amount simply to this: .They are rules imposed by the
temporary holders of the reins of government for the pur-
pose of safeguarding the interests of the community from
the conceived dangers of unrestricted association.
We have endeavored to trace in outline the history of the
development of the conception of a corporation in the
common law of England. It has been deemed impossible
10 E. g., the Northern Securities Case.
71 Victor Morawetz, Private Corporations.
732 Duguit, L'Etat, Le Droit Objectif et la Loi Positive, Paris, x9oi.
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within reasonable limits to follow every detail of the sub-
ject. No doubt there exists and has existed since the time
of Coke a well-defined legal conception of what a corpora-
tion really is. Much of the apparent confusion on the sub-
ject is due to two causes: First, the many kinds of corpora-
tions73 which have existed from "time immemorial" in
English law; second, the mass of legislation which has
during the past seventy years been overlaid upon the sub-
ject. We have not followed up the development of minor
titles of the law, but have tried to seize the essence of cor-
porations as understood" by the common law. We have
desired to show that the focal idea was and is that of a
single titulary of property which is subject to the use of
many individuals. That such individuality has no real
existence. That this was admitted centuries ago by com-
mentators who, imbued with ideas of divine right, asserted
that the prince might create this invisible being out of hand.
Further, we have endeavored to show that this notion has
survived even until now. That though the prince was
driven from his throne, usurping legislatures might, accord-
ing to the accepted view, also arbitrarily create intangible
persons. Finally, that when the pendulum had swung so
far that courts found themselves gravely discussing the
point as to whether a corporation, having no soul, could be
excommunicated or not,7 4 it swung the other way, and
that we are now on the upward beat toward common sense.
History is valueless if it teaches us no lessons. When
the multitude of corporations is greater than the sands of
the sea and their wealth more vast than Croesus ever
dreamed, the problem of their control is of transcendent
importance. Would we restrict their acquisitions? Then
let us consider -the barons and their statutes of mortmain.
Would we be sure that their business is conducted without
harm to the public? Then: let us observe the "visitors" of
charitable corporations.75  Much may be learned from the
treatment and resolution of ancient problems.
In short, though this is an age of codification of law and
Kyd, p. 320. 4 E. g., In Tipling v. PezaU, 2 Bulst. 233 (x613).
"The scheme suggested here has been in practical operation in the
case of National Banks for over forty years.
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though corporations in England must not be called so but
pass under the name of joint stock companies,"6 the study
of bygone ideas is of practical and instant value.
One thing we may predicate of the future development
of the law of corporations. Having now ir many cases and
sometimes by virtue of legislative enactment escaped from
the subtlety of the legal thought of the Middle Ages, the
law is on the way toward perfection in the not far distant
future. At some happy day, not yet arrived, the rights of
the public and of the minority stockholders will be adjusted
with equity to all.
In conclusion, we may say that in following the develop-
ment of the law from the earliest ages to the present time
we must realize that we stand upon the threshold of a new
era. Legal problems of vast import concerning corpora-
tions must be solved in the near future. Guided by past
experience and accumulated wisdom, let us hope that our
judicial and other lawmakers will solve them wisely and
well.
Edmund Bayly Seymour, Jr.
10 Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Mass., zo Wall, 566 (1870).
